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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION,
a Texas corporation,
Plainti ff-Appellant
and Cross-Respondent,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Case No. 860413

v.
GAIL C. POTTER AND LORI
POTTER, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents
and Cross-Appellants.

Pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
plaintiff-appellant and cross-respondent "plaintiff" The
Southland Corporation submits its Appellant's Brief.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues (as they relate to plaintiff's
appeal) are presented for review.
• 1.

Did the evidence establish that there were

agreements between the parties1 predecessor in title and
plaintiff which ran with the land so as to bind defendants
and give plaintiff the right of ingress and egress over the
property in question and did the trial court err in holding
otherwise?
2.

Did the evidence establish that plaintiff has an

implied easement over the property in question and did the
trial court err in holding otherwise?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Are the trial court's Findings of Fact supported by

the evidence and are its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law sufficient to support its judgment?
NATURE OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an action where plaintiff seeks a determination
that it has certain rights of ingress and egress over
property between its 7-Eleven store property and Dixie Drive
in West Jordan City, Utah.

Plaintiff contends that there

were agreements with a common predecessor in title affording
such right of ingress and egress and that such agreements
ran with the land so as to bind defendants.

It further

contends that the agreements and circumstances under which
the property was acquired from the common predecessor
created an implied easement over such property.
On January 8, 1986, defendants caused a barrier
(consisting of cables strung between steel poles) to be
erected along the eastern boundary of the property in
question and the western boundary of plaintiff's property.
During the preceding eighteen months after defendants
purchased the property, there had been no other attempts to
preclude the use of the property by plaintiff's customers
and suppliers.
Following the erection of the barrier, this action was
brought and a hearing on plaintiff's request for preliminary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

injunction was held on January 20, 1986.

During the hearing

it was agreed by the parties that a preliminary injunction
could issue for a period of sixty days, at which time a
trial on the merits would he held.

Following the trial held

on April 11, 1986, the trial court took the matter under
advisement.

On May 23, 1986, it issued a memorandum

decision holding that plaintiff had no rights in the
property and dismissing defendants1 counterclaim seeking
damages for use of the property on the basis that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that defendants had
sustained such damages.
23, 1986.

The judgment was entered on June

Thereafter, defendants erected a fence completely

around the property in question, limiting access to the
7-Eleven store to one curbcut on the side of the store,
resulting in a substantial loss of business to plaintiff.
At the trial, defendants1 attorney had in fact stipulated
and the trial court had taken judicial notice of the fact
that there would be an economic impact upon plaintiff if the
property in question could not be driven across (R. 183) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Texas corporation qualified to do
business in Utah and is operating 7-Eleven convenience food
stores therein and elsewhere (R. 2, R. 44). Defendants are
land developers who are residents of California (R. 214-15).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the 1970 's the parties1 common predecessor in title,
Big Six Corporation, and an affiliate, Dixie Six Corporation, developed a large residential area in West Jordan,
Utah, known as "Dixie Valley."

They set aside six acres of

land located at 6200 South and Dixie Drive (3255 West) to be
developed as a shopping center to serve the residential area
(R. 199). Big Six was the affiliate designated to develop
the shopping center (R. 199). Big Six is the common
predecessor in title of plaintiff and defendants (R. 90, R.
156, R. 165, R. 239; Exs. 10, 12).
In April 1975 plaintiff entered into an agreement (R.
159; Ex. 1) with Big Six Corporation to purchase a parcel of
the shopping center for the construction of a 7-Eleven
store.

The agreement was specifically subject to the

purchased property being properly rezoned and plaintiff
being able to obtain permits and licenses for such store (R.
162; Ex. 1 ) . It indicated that there would be "open access"
between the 7-Eleven store property and the shopping center.
At that time, none of the property set aside for the
shopping center was zoned for commercial purposes.

Such

store could not be constructed thereon nor could the
shopping center be developed with such zoning (R. 171. R.
200; Exs. 6 , 7 ) .
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Under the terms of the original agreement (Ex. 1), the
7-Eleven store was to have faced north, fronting on 6200
South, and the survey for the shopping center (Ex, 9)
performed for Big Six so indicated (R. 161). At that time,
it was contemplated that the West Valley Expressway (still
under consideration) would run north and south directly to
the east of the proposed shopping center and that there
would be access to the expressway off 6200 South, directly
east of the property being purchased for the 7-Eleven store
(R. 188, R. 200). For that reason and upon the recommendation of its city planner, West Jordan City refused to rezone
the property to allow the construction of either the
7-Eleven store or the shopping center as a whole (R. 166;
Exs. 6, 7). During the attempts to obtain rezoning,
representatives of Big Six appeared before the West Jordan
Planning Commission to present plans for the 7-Eleven store
and at that time they were told that in order to obtain
approval, the store would have to be faced west rather than
north as originally proposed (R. 186-8; Exs. 6, 7). •
In December 1975 the West Jordan City Council met after
being assured by both Mr. Bowles, an officer of Big Six, and
the surveyor for Big Six Corporation that the 7-Eleven store
would be turned so that access was off Dixie Drive rather
than 6200 South and the council then agreed to the rezoning
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Ex. 6 ) . In April 1976, following such rezoning, Mr. Bowles
appeared before the Planning Commission to obtain a building
permit for the 7-Eleven store (R. 205; Ex. 6 ) . At that
time, the site plan still showed the 7-Eleven store fronting
on 6200 South.

The Planning Commission approved the

building permit only on the conditions that the store be
faced west with access off Dixie Drive and that proper
assurances to that effect first be received by the city
planner (R. 191-3; Ex. 6 ) .
Several days later, Mr. Bowles, representing Big Six
Corporation, and Mr. E. L. Pack, Zone Manager for plaintiff,
signed a short letter agreement (Ex. 3 ) , written on West
Jordan City letterhead, which was intended to give such
assurances (R. 173, R. 191-6, R. 202-3).

The agreement

provided, in effect, that (1) if the 7-Eleven store was
faced west, the city would allow access from 6200 South
until construction of the West Valley Expressway, at which
time it might have to be closed; (2) there would have to be
two rights-of-way in from Dixie Drive from the store; and
(3) all property between Dixie Drive and the store would
have to be blacktopped and landscaped at 7-Elevenfs expense
(Ex. 3 ) . Mr. Bowles testified that Big Six was agreeing
thereby to provide access off Dixie Drive to handle the
traffic load.

Mr. Bowles also testified (R. 201-2) :

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q.
issuance
the city
which is

Okay, in any event, in connection with an
of a building permit for 7-Eleven stores,
was requiring access onto Dixie Drive
3655 West?

A. I don't know what they are (sic)
requiring for 7-Eleven. I do know that in our
scheme we were prepared to put ingress and egress
on Dixie Drive to satisfy our needs. When I say
"our", I am referred to Big Six Corporation's
needs.
Q. In fact, the city—you previously
testified that the city wanted egress and ingress
off of Dixie Drive?
A.

They did.

Q. That you previously have testified that
you were willing to give at that time the 7-Eleven
store egress and ingress off Dixie Drive in
response to that and stated "We had to have it for
our own development." Is that your answer to that
question at that time?
A.

That is correct.

Before Mr. Bowles appearances at the Planning Commission, but after the City Council meeting (Ex. 6 ) , the
original purchase agreement (Ex. 1) had, in fact, been
amended to change the dimensions so that the 7-Eleven store
was reoriented to front on Dixie Drive (R. 171, R. 201).
The amended purchase agreement (Ex. 2) changed the legal
description to turn the property to face Dixie Drive, thus
running longitudinally east and west rather than north and
south (Exs. 1, 2, 11). The amended agreement also contained
a plot plan, signed by the then president of Big Six (now
deceased) (R. 201), which specifically provided that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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property in question would be "open parking" and that
immediately to the south thereof would be a "fifty-foot
service road" (Ex. ?) .
The 7-Eleven store was completed, as shown on the
amended agreement (Ex. 2) , in September 1976 and the
improvements installed around that time (R. 135; Ex. 4).
The improvements were constructed at the expense of
plaintiff and with the concurrence of Big Six.

They

consisted of blacktopping to Dixie Drive, installation of
curb and gutter and landscaping along 6200 South to Dixie
Drive.

These improvements have remained in place basically

as originally constructed (Ex. 8).
In November 1976, because of the need for additional
width resulting from the store's reorientation, plaintiff
entered into an agreement with Dixie Six (to whom the
property had been conveyed by Big Six) (R. 181) to purchase
an additional twenty feet along the southern boundary of its
property.

At the time these parcels were purchased by

plaintiff, the parties contemplated that the property in
question would be open for mutual use by 7-Eleven and the
other occupants of the shopping center and that nothing was
to be constructed thereon except a sign designating the
shopping center to be located at the corner of 62 00 South
and Dixie Drive (R. 176-7; Exs. 1, 2). When the 7-Eleven
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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store was constructed, the property purchased by plaintiff,
as well as the property in question, was not only blacktopped and landscaped, but was raised several feet above the
surrounding property (R. 204). It had been used by
plaintiff's customers and suppliers since that time for
ingress and egress to the 7-Eleven store until defendants
constructed a fence around the property in question
following the trial court's judgment herein (R. 102-3).
The shopping center was not developed as planned by Big
Six Corporation (Ex. 8). In fact, except for the 7-Eleven
store, the property stood vacant until it was purchased in
June 1984 by defendants (R. 217). At the time of defendants' purchase, they noticed that the property in question
appeared to be part of the 7-Eleven property, although title
was in Big Six (R. 208, R. 239). They noticed that it was
being used by the store's customers and were curious as to
whether 7-Eleven had any rights to the property.

They

questioned the real estate agent who handled the matter and
were assured that there were no "recorded" rights. Although
there is a dispute as to when the conversation took place,
plaintiff's representative testified in effect that whether
they recorded it or not, they claimed an interest in the
property and would be willing to fight over it (R. 231).
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The property which was to have been developed by Big
Six as a shopping center was purchased by defendants and
conveyed to them on June 4, 1984, by warranty deed (Ex. 10)
which was subject not only to easements, covenants and
conditions of existing record, but those "enforceable in law
or in equity."

Defendants have since constructed a portion

of a shopping center on the south end of the property, but
not on the north end where the 7-Eleven store is located (R.
215) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff and defendants1 common predecessor in title,
Big Six Corporation, entered into agreements with plaintiff
to allow it access over property in front of the 7-Eleven
store constructed by it.

The 7-Eleven store was to be part

of a shopping center which was to have been constructed by
Big Six.

In connection with those agreements, plaintiff had

agreed to reorient its store so that the entire property
could be rezoned and the property in question was to be open
for use by all occupants of the shopping center.

Without

use of the property in question, plaintiff has no frontage
for its 7-Eleven store, but only a small curbcut on the side
of its property, which is not sufficient to allow the
operation of such store economically.
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These agreements touch and concern the properties and
hence ran with the land so as to bind defendants.

At the

time defendants purchased the property from Big Six, it had
been utilized by plaintiff's customers and suppliers for a
period of approximately nine years.

The occupancy of the

property in question by plaintiff was evident.

Thus,

defendants had notice of plaintiff's rights at the time they
purchased the property, but they did not make adequate, if
any, inquiry regarding those rights.
The circumstances created an implied easement in favor
of plaintiff over the property in question and all conditions required by law for the acquisition of such easement
had been met.

Finally, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law were totally inadequate.

Indeed, there was no

finding on any of the material issues.

The conclusions,

which purport to be findings, were not supported by the
evidence and even if they were, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law did not support the judgment entered
herein.
POINT I
The evidence before the trial court clearly established
that the parties' common predecessor in interest entered
into agreements with plaintiff to allow it access over the
property in question from Dixie Drive to its 7-Eleven store
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and that such agreements ran with the land so as to bind
defendants.

The trial court erred in not considering all of

the circumstances behind such agreements and holding that
the agreements were not sufficient for such purpose.
There were three written documents received into
evidence herein which, when considered with all of the
negotiations and circumstances leading up to their execution, clearly establish that Big Six Corporation would
furnish access consisting of two rights-of-way across the
property in question for ingress and egress to the 7-Eleven
store.

The first two were the agreement of sale and the

amendment thereto.

The original agreement clearly provided

that there would be "open access" between the shopping
center in question and the 7-Eleven store property.

The

amendment provided that such property was to be "open
parking."

These two writings substantiate plaintiff1s

contentions and testimony that the property was to remain
open for common use by all occupants of the shopping center,
including ingress and egress to the 7-Eleven store.
Of even stronger import was an express written
agreement (Ex. 3) between Big Six, the parties1 predecessor
in title, and plaintiff to allow such access.

Admittedly,

that agreement could have been expressed in clearer and more
detailed language.

Nonetheless, v/hen the circumstances
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under which it was written and all other factors are taken
into consideration, the intended purpose and effect of such
agreement is not difficult to comprehend.

Moreover, there

is not, as defendants1 attorney has suggested, any need to
modify or contradict a written agreement and thus violate
the parole evidence rule.
dictory.

First, there is nothing contra-

Second, it has long been established that when a

writing is ambiguous, obscure in its terms or incomplete
that parole or extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show
what was in the minds of the parties at the time of making
the agreement in order to determine the objective thereof.
It is particularly clear that evidence of surrounding
circumstances or previous negotiations, dealings or events
may be received for such purpose.

A case to such effect is

Winegar v. Smith Invest. Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah 1979).
Other pertinent cases are University Club v. Invesco Holding
Corp., 504 P.2d 29 (Utah 1972); The Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957).

The rule

is well stated in Restatement of Contracts 2d, § 210
(Comment b, p. 118), as follows:
That a writing was or was not adopted as a
completely integrated agreement may be proved by
any relevant evidence. A document in the form of
a written contract, signed by both parties and
apparently complete on its face may be decisive of
the issue in the absence of credible contrary
evidence. But a writing cannot of itself prove
its own completeness and wide latitude must be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on
the intention of the parties.
It cannot be disputed that there were written agreements between plaintiff and Big Six regarding the parcel in
question.

Mr. Bowles, who signed the letter agreement,

acknowledged that he did so as an officer of Big Six and
that its purpose was to afford access to the 7-Eleven store
from Dixie Drive (R. 201-3) . The evidence is also clear
that he did so for the mutual benefit of both plaintiff and
Big Six, which was interested in obtaining working capital
because "they needed the dollars." And they could not
otherwise comply with the agreement of sale and get their
shopping center zoned for commercial purposes.

Both parties

recognized that the small side entrance on 6200 South was
subject to being closed off at any time; and, thus, access
to the 7-Eleven store would have to be off Dixie Drive, upon
which the 7-Eleven store was then to front.

Thus, this

change was done more to accommodate Big Six than plaintiff
and was in connection with the general plan of development
for its proposed shopping center.
Considering these extrinsic factors, one could not
reasonably and fairly contend that there were not agreements
between Big Six and plaintiff providing for access across
the property in question.

The only question is whether such
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agreements "ran with the land" so as to bind defendants.
Plaintiff submits that they do.
In order for a burden or a promise respecting use of
land to run with the land so as to bind successors in title
of a promisor, four requirements must be met.

(1) The

promise must be in writing; (2) the parties must have
intended that the promise run with the land; (3) the promise
must "touch and concern" the land; and (4) there must be
privity between the promisee (plaintiff) and the promisor
(Big Six) and between the promisor (Big Six) and the person
sought to be bound (defendants).

These requirements are set

forth in Restatement of Property, §§ 530-538 (1944).
All four requirements have been plainly satisfied in
the present case.

First, the agreements were evidenced by

at least two writings; second, the circumstances indicated
that the parties intended that the agreements run with the
land.

In such regard, this court has unequivocally

established that circumstances surrounding execution of the
covenant may indicated the necessary intention.

Thus, in

Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 373 P.2d
940 (1962), it found the necessary intention primarily
because the purpose of the covenant was to benefit the
promisee's permanent business interests.

It held that the

circumstances of a transaction may prove the intention that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the agreement run with the land despite the absence of a
specific term binding the parties' successors.
Here, the circumstances weigh even more heavily in
favor of such finding.

Without the guaranteed means of

ingress and egress, particularly when its access on 6200
South could have been closed off by West Jordan City, the
plaintiff's land would have been entirely valueless.

That

circumstance negates any argument that the arrangement was
not to be a permanent one. Moreover, there is really no
doubt that the 7-Eleven store was to have been a part of the
proposed shopping center.
occupant.

It was in fact the first

Thus, Restatement of Property, § 531, p. 3198

(1944), is particularly pertinent:
If the promise was procured by the promisee
in a pursuit of a general plan of development
which includes not only the land with respect to
which the promise was made, but other land as
well, the likelihood that the promise was expected
to be binding upon the successors of the promisor
is great, as it would in all probability seriously
interfere with a successful carrying out of the
plan if this were net true. A general plan
implies a controlled stability of use and
appearance. This fact is one of the chief
inducements to purchase under the plan. Such
stability is within the normal expectations of the
parties. . . .
It would not exist unless the
promises respecting use made by the parties to the
conveyances under the plan bound not only the
respective promisors but their successors as well.
(Emphasis added.)
That section also notes that expression of intention
need not take any particular form.

Yet, the permanency of
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the situation apparently sought to be produced by performance of the promise substantially increases the probability
that such promise was intended to bind the promisor's
successor.
Here there is not only written evidence of an intention
that the promise to afford access runs with the land, but
also the numerous factors mentioned above strongly establish
that such intention must be presumed.

The only other

presumption would be that plaintiff was being led down the
primrose path by Big Six and its officers.
There can be no argument as to the remaining two
requirements.

The promises made by Big Six relate to the

physical use of both the 7-Eleven store property and the
property in question and, thus, "touch and concern" the
land.

See Restatement of Property, § 537 (1944).

As to the

requirement of privity, both plaintiff and defendants
purchased their property from the same seller; hence, the
requirements of Restatement of Property, § 534 (1944), that
the promisor must be in privity with both the promisee and
promisor's successor in title have been met.
Indeed, all of the conditions required to establish an
agreement running with the land are present and readily
ascertainable in the present case.

Plaintiff, as promisee,

is entitled to enforce the promise against defendants.
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The

inequity of holding otherwise is readily apparent.

Except

for plaintiff's cooperation in amending the agreement of
sale so the 7-Eleven store would face west rather than
north, Big Six, would not have been able to have its land
zoned for a shopping center.

Inasmuch as no further

development had taken place on the property until it was
purchased by defendants, the property would presumably still
remain residentially zoned and its value at the time of such
sale would have been substantially less than it was.
Plaintiff believes that this court could not readily
accept an argument that if Big Six still owned the land and
was ready to begin development of a shopping center, it
could come to plaintiff and say "Our plans have been
changed.

You will no longer have any frontage for your

property, but must rely on access only to 6200 South, if
available."
Plaintiff further submits that defendants are in no
better position to deny access than Big Six, the original
promisor, would be.

The promise contained in the agreements

is one which meets all of the requirements for and does in
fact run with the land.

Defendants are thus bound by those

agreements.
There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions
dealing with the question of whether an agreement does or
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does not run with the land.

These basically have been

decided on their individual facts and it would serve no
useful purpose to restate them here.

Most, however, have

followed the Restatement requirements set forth above. One
case which discusses the issue of intent and follows the
holding of this court in Metropolitan Investment

Co. v.

Sine, supra, is Updegrave v. Agee, 484 P.2d 821 (Ore. 1971).
This case involved an easement over real property.

The

court held that the presence of absence of the phrase
"successors or assigns" in the agreement is but one element
to be considered in determining the intention of the
parties.
Two other Utah cases are clearly distinguishable.

In

Lundberg v. Dastrup, 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 P.2d 648 (1962), the
court held that a covenant to pay attorney's fees does not
run with the land because:
. . . in order for a covenant to run with the land
it must be of such character that its performance
or non-performance will so affect the use, value
or enjoyment of the land itself that it must be
regarded as an integral part of the property.
497 P.2d at 650.
In First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 2 7
Utah 2d, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), the court found that a benefit
did not run with the land because the evidence expressly
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negated the presence of the requisite intention that it so
run.
POINT II
Under the circumstances of this case, the severance of
property under the common ownership of the parties1
predecessor in title created an easement by implication for
ingress and egress over the property in question and the
trial court erred in not so holding.
As do most other jurisdictions, Utah has long recognized that severance of property under common ownership may
create an easement by implication or "necessity."

See,

e.g., Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948);
Adamson v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
That principle is treated in Restatement of Property, § 474,
p. 2972 (1944), et seq., in the following language:
When land in one ownership is divided into
separately owned parts by conveyance, an easement
may be created within the limitations set forth in
§§ 475 and 476, in favor of one who has or may
have a possessory interest in one part as against
one who has or may have a possessory interest in
another part by implication from the circumstances
under which the conveyance was made alone.
(Emphasis added.)
The Restatement then delineates the factors which are
considered in determining whether an easement by implication
has been created.

Plaintiff believes that all of these

factors are present here and compel a finding that such an
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easement was created.

Moreover, it is not necessary that

the person in whose favor the easement was implied has no
other means of access to his property.

Thus, under §

476(g), p. 2983-4, it is stated:
. . . If land can be used without an easement, but
cannot be used without disproportionate effort and
expense, an easement may still be implied in favor
of either the conveyor or conveyee on the basis of
necessity alone without reference to prior use.
If the necessity of an easement is such that
without it the land cannot be effectively used,
nothing less than the explicit language in the
conveyance negating the creation of the easement
will prevent its implication.
That was also the holding by this court, in Adamson v.
Brockbank, supra.

In that case, this court plainly ruled

that absolute necessity was not required and that such
principle has "yielded to the rule that the necessity
requisite to the creation of an easement by implication is
sufficient if it is a 'reasonable necessity1."

The court

also, relying upon the Restatement of Property, § 467, p.
2978, noted:
An easement created by implication arises as
an inference of the intention of the parties to a
conveyance of land. The inference is drawn from
the circumstances under which the conveyance was
made rather than from the language of the
conveyance. To draw an inference of intention
from such circumstances, they must be or must be
assumed to be within the knowledge of the parties.
The inference drawn represents an attempt to
ascribe an intention to parties who had not
thought or had not bothered to put the intention
into words or perhaps more often to parties who
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actually had formed no intention conscious to
themselves.
185 P.2d at 270.
In concluding, the court made the further observation:
Whether or not the artificial arrangement of
the material properties of his estate by the
owner, constituted a technical easement is, under
the facts and circumstances of this case,
immaterial. It clearly created a condition to the
land sold partaking of the character of an
easement, constituting at least a quasi easement,
visible to the purchaser, and one of the things in
the minds of the parties when the bargain of sale
was made . . . and the vendor could not thereafter
derogate from his own grant.
185 P.2d 271.
In the present case, now that the entire frontage has
been fenced off, access to the store has become severely
reduced.

The sole access consists of only one curbcut to

the side, not the front of the store, to service both the
store itself and the gas islands.

This is not sufficient

for the operation of a convenience food store.

As recog-

nized by the trial court and stipulated to by defendants1
attorney (R. 183), defendants1 actions in denying access
have had a significant detrimental impact on the operation
of the 7-Eleven store.

Several of the photographic exhibits

clearly demonstrate this (Ex. 8). Thus, the above language,
from both the Restatement of Property and Adamson, comes
into play and this court should recognize that an easement
by implication was created over the property in question.
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The failure to record the agreements or notice of
plaintiff's rights does not prevent it from enforcing them
against defendants.

While the trial court did not get to

that issue, having determined that the agreements were
insufficient to give plaintiff any rights to ingress and
egress over the property in question, it is an issue that
has consistently been argued by defendants and is therefore
being briefly addressed herein.
Defendants have consistently maintained as a principal
defense that there was no conveyance of an interest in real
estate within the meaning of § 57-1-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953,
and that there was nothing placed of record as provided by
§ 57-3-3, Utah Code Ann., 1953.

In answer to these

contentions, plaintiff has pointed out that the first
contention entirely begs the question.

Plaintiff is not

contending that there was any actual "conveyance."

It does

maintain, however, that such written conveyance is not
always necessary to create an interest in or rights over
some else's land.

Otherwise, there would be no reason to

even talk about agreements running with the land, easements
by necessity, prescriptive easements or the like. The
courts have consistently agreed that implementation of these
doctrines can and does create rights or interests in the
land without a written conveyance.

Moreover, they have long
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recognized that recording of a conveyance or other instrument is not always necessary to provide notice of any rights
to a prospective purchaser.
The basic purpose in recording an instrument is to give
constructive notice of the matters stated therein.

In the

present case, defendants had actual notice, which is not
only notice in fact received, but also such as a party is
presumed to have received personally because the evidence
within his knowledge was sufficient to put him in inquiry.
See

Salt Lake, Garfield and Western Railway Co. v. Allied

Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 883 (1955).

In order

to take advantage of the recording act, defendants would
have to show that they were bona fide purchasers.

But, as

stated in Blodgett v. March, 590 P.2d 289 (Utah 1978):
A bona fide purchaser is one who takes
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts
sufficient to put him on notice of the complaina n t s equity.
590 P.2d at 303.
POINT III
The trial court's purported Findings of Fact are
neither findings nor are the conclusionary statements
purported to be findings supported by the evidence and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not sufficient
to support the trial court's judgment.
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The pleadings herein clearly raised the issues set
forth above that plaintiff was in possession of the property
in question at the time it was purchased by defendant; that
there were agreements running with the land to allow
plaintiff access over said property; that in any event,
plaintiff had an implied easement across said property.
Evidence regarding these issues was offered by plaintiff and
received by the trial court.

Yet, there was really no

Findings of Fact regarding any of these issues.
This court has had several occasions to rule on the
adequacy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and had
consistently held, as it did in Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979), that:
The importance of complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a
judge is essential to the resolution of dispute
under the proper rule of law. To that end, the
findings should be sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached. (Citing cases.)
Unless findings of fact meet such standards,
application of the proper rule of law is difficult, if not impossible, and the reviewing
function of this court is seriously undermined.
598 P.2d at 1338-9.
This court has also repeatedly held that failure of a
trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the
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judgment be vacated.

Thus, in Anderson v. Utah County Board

of Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), it stated:
It is true that we indulge the presumption of
regularity in the proceedings before the trial
court. But this does not suffice when the record
itself exposes essential deficiencies. With
certain exceptions not applicable here, the just
quoted rule must be complied with and a judgment
cannot stand unless there are findings which will
justify it.
598 P.2d at 1219.
In LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson,

18 Utah 2d 260,

420 P.2d 615 (1966), the court, citing an earlier case,
declared:
It is the duty of the trial court to find
upon materials issues raised by the pleadings, and
the failure to do so is reversible error.
420 P.2d at 616.
See also, Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc.,
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).

v

Finally, Rule 52, U.R.C.P., requires that Findings of
Fact be made upon all material issues and Rule 52(b) allows
failure to make adequate findings to be challenged whether
or not objection to such findings was made in the district
court.
As measured by the above standards and those set forth
in numerous other cases, the Findings of Fact in the present
case are woefully inadequate.

Findings No. 1, 2 and 3, for

example, do not relate to any issue over which there was any
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contest and in no way address the issues to be decided by
the trial court.

While purported Finding No. 4 does to some

extent address those issues, it is not a finding at all, but
rather a series of conclusionary statements which merely
attempt to reinforce the contentions made by defendants.
That purported finding has in fact been restated almost
verbatim as Conclusion of Law No. 3.

Thus, not only are the

purported findings inadequate as findings, but the conclusionary statements therein are either immaterial (e.g.,
those holding that there was no recorded document conveying
any easement or property rights to plaintiff and that there
v/as no written conveyance or recordable instrument conveying
any property right thereto) or supported by the evidence
(e.g., the conclusion that plaintiff's claim of easement is
without basis).
As noted above, there was more than adequate evidence
to support plaintiff's contention that there were agreements
running with the land to allow plaintiff access across the
subject property or there v/as an implied easement in favor
of plaintiff for such access.

The first contention—which

is the principal basis of this action—is not even mentioned
in the findings.
Apart from the almost total lack of any proper Findings
of Fact, neither those findings nor the Conclusions of Law
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are supported by the evidence.

Conclusion No. 1 again was

not at issue in this case and was in fact admitted by
plaintiff.

Conclusion No. 2 is not supported either by the

evidence or by any finding.

The same is true with Conclu-

sion No. 3 which, as noted above, is merely a reiteration of
the alleged Finding No. 4.

Again, most of it is immaterial.

Plaintiff admits that defendants' rights in the
property are superior to those of plaintiff, but this does
not answer the questions presented as to whether the entire
property can be blocked off to prohibit access thereover
which was agreed to by the parties1 common predecessor in
title.

Plaintiff has admitted that there was no recorded

instrument conveying property rights to it, but under the
issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, that is
immaterial.

Plaintiff submits that it has, through legally

recognized means, acquired some rights over the property
which cannot be completely cut off and taken away by
defendants.

Neither the Findings of Fact nor the Conclu-

sions of Law address this matter.

Thus, the judgment

entered by the trial court is totally unsupportable by the
evidence or by its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions and
should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that an affirmance of the trial
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court's decision herein will result in an extreme injustice
to it.

Contrary to assertions made by defendants that

plaintiff is trying to get something for nothing—that it
gave no consideration for the rights of access it claims to
exist—the record supports the opposite conclusion.

In

reliance upon promises made by Big Six, plaintiff (1) agreed
to proceed with the purchase and reorient the store and in
doing so, gave up frontage on an established road with the
necessary curb cuts; (2) blacktopped the property in
question and provided curb, gutter and landscaping to Dixie
Drive (see Ex. 8 photographs); (3) agreed to provide open
access between the 7-Eleven store property and the shopping
center.

This was done under circumstances where the

property in question was to remain open for use by all
occupants thereof.

In view of these circumstances and under

applicable law cited above, the promises were of a character
which ran with the land and defendants are obligated to
honor them.
Defendants argue that the conditions imposed by West
Jordan City cannot bind them.
question.

This, however, is not the

The actions of West Jordan City merely demon-

strate the circumstances under which the letter agreement
was reached.

Moreover, even before that time, the agreement

of sale and the amendment thereto provided for such access
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and mutual use.

It would be entirely inequitable at this

point to allow Big Six's successor to abrogate those
agreements and impose a substantial economic loss upon
plainti ff.
This court should therefore find that there were
covenants running with the land, allowing plaintiff access
from Dixie Drive to its 7-Eleven store or that there was an
implied easement for such purpose, J
As to this inadequacy of the purported Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law, little argument is necessary.

A

review thereof, plaintiff submits, will clearly support the
argument set forth above, both that there really were no
proper Findings of Fact, that the conclusions, purporting to
be findings, were not supported by the evidence and that
neither the Findings of Fact nor the Conclusions of Law
signed by the trial court support its judgment.
Plaintiff requests that this court rule that the
evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants
are bound by the agreements with the parties1 common
predecessor in title affording access over the property in
question from Dixie Drive to the 7-Eleven store; that
plaintiff is entitled to such access and that it therefore
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for
proceedings consistent with such ruling.

Alternatively,
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plaintiff requests that the court remand to the trial court
for entry of appropriate Findings of Fact on all material
issues presented by the pleadings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Q

day of November,

1986.

talc L. Jerman
Ralph

B. 'L. Dart
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that dn the Q
day of November, 1986, -a-w^o^
true and correct copy&of Appellant1s Brief ^1^" served upon^
by delivering -a- cop^to Robert M. Felton, attorney for
defendants, 5 Triad Center, Suite 585, Salt Lake City, Utah
84180.
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\i EXHIBIT
±
*r

Store No. ./g.3-^

CONTRACT OF SALE
1. PARTIES. THIS CONTRACT is between
Big Six Corporation
herein called "Seller", whether one or more, and
herein called "Buyer".

The S o u t h l and C o r p o r a t i o n

2. PREMISES. Seller hereby sells and agrees to convey to Buyer and Buyer hereby buys
and agrees to pay for real estate in the City of S a l t Lake
Countyof
SaltLake
and State of
Utah
,
as described on Exhibit "A", attached hereto, together with all and singular the improvements
thereon and the rights and appurtenances pertaining thereto, including any right, title, and
interest of Seller in and to adjacent streets, alleys, or rights-of-way; such real estate, rights and
appurtenances being herein called the "property." This contract also covers all fixtures and
articles of personal property attached to the property and owned by Seller, such as air conditioning and heating equipment, light fixtures, and shrubbery, and all such fixtures and articles
of personal property are included in the purchase price set forth in Paragraph 4 below.
3. ESCROW AGENT. The parties agree that Lawyer's Title Insurance Corporation, or its
designated affiliate, herein called "LTIC", shall act as escrow agent, and shall receive and
deliver all documents or instruments and receive and disburse all sums of money according to
the written instructions of the parties and the terms of this contract. The fee or charge of
LTIC for serving as escrow agent shall be shared equally by the parties.
4. CONSIDERATION. The purchase price is
Twenty Two Thousand
. . . , . , . , . .
• • •
• Dollars ($ 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ), herein called the "purchase
price", of which One Thousand
, .Dollars ($ 1 , 0 0 9 . 0 0 ) has been
deposited by Buyer as earnest money with LTIC, herein called the "earnest money deposit",
which earnest money deposit and the balance of the purchase price shall be paid to Seller at
the closing.
5. TITLE, (a) Seller agrees at Seller's own expense to furnish Buyer within thirty (30) days
from the date hereof a preliminary title report or binder issued by LTIC, herein called the "preliminary title report or binder," giving the current condition of title to the property, together
with copies of ail instruments necessary to explain fully the extent, scope, and effect of any
matters which are listed as exceptions in the preliminary title report or binder, whereby LTIC
binds itself to issue to Buyer or its nominee for the full amount of the purchase price an A.L.T.A.
Policy — Standard Form B 1970, or a comparable form with extended coverage if such form
is not approved in the state in which the property is located, herein called the "title policy".
(b) From the date of receipt by Buyer of the preliminary title report or binder and the
survey provided for in Paragraph 7 hereof, whichever occurs later. Buyer shall have not more
than thirty (30) days within which to examine the same. If in the opinion of Buyer's attorneys
the preliminary title report or binder shows good and merchantable titie in fee simple in Seller
such as LTIC will insure as provided herein, this transaction shall be closed, herein called the
"closing", within twenty (20) days thereafter, or within twenty (20) days after all of the
conditions of Paragraph 11 hereof have been fulfilled as provided therein or waived by Buyer,
whichever occurs later, by the execution and delivery by Seller or the record owner of title to
the property of a good and sufficient general warranty deed to Buyer conveying the property
free and clear of any and all encumbrances or securities except those which are acceptable to
Buyer, the payment by Seller of the premium for the title policy and the payment by Buyer to
Seller of the purchase price.
(c) If in the opinion of Buyer's attorneys, the preliminary title report or binder does
not show good and merchantable title in Seller such as LTIC will insure as provided in Paragraph 5(b) above, Buyer shall notify Seller of any objections to Seller's title within the thirty
(30) day period provided for examination of the preliminary title report or binder and survey,
and Seller agrees to make all reasonable efforts to cure such objections within thirty (30) days
after receipt of such notice. If within such thirty (30) day period Seller delivers to Buyer curative
matter or information, Buyer shall have twenty (20) days after the end of such thirty (30) day
period for examination thereof. If within such twenty (20) day period title is approved by
Buyer's attorneys, this transaction shall thereafter be closed within the time and as provided
in Paragraph 5(b) above. If the title has not been approved by Buyer at the end of such thirty
(30) day period (or such twenty (20) day period, if applicable), Buyer shall have a period of
fifteen (15) days thereafter within which to waive or attempt itself to cure its objections to title,
if it desires to do either. If such objections to Seller's title are not cured by Seller or Buyer or
waived by Buyer within the time provided, Buyer may terminate this contract and the earnest
money deposit shall be returned to Buyer. If within the times provided, title has been approved
by Buyer, or Buyer's objections have been cured by Seller or Buyer or waived by Buyer, this
transaction shall thereafter be closed within the time and as provided in Paragraph 5(b) above.
6. SELLER'S USE COVENANT. It is understood that the property is being acquired by
Buyer for the purpose of erecting and operating thereon a convenience grocery and dairy products
store, with the location of the store building, signs, and curb breaks to be as shown on the sketch
which is Exhibit " B " , attached hereto, or as changed or modified by Buyer and that in the event
it should develop that such use of the property would violate any ordinances or that Buyer
1
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would be prevented from so using and enjoying the property by any regulation or restriction
affecting the property, or by failure or refusal of any authority having jurisdiction over the
property to issue any permit or license, then such fact or facts shall be treated as objections to
Sellers title, the provisions herein with reference thereto shall apply, and Buyer shall not be
required to accept title or to pay for the property.
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7. SURVEY. At Seller's expense, Seller agrees to furnish Buyer, along with the preliminary
title report or binder, a topographic survey, herein tailed the "survey", acceptable to LTIC
for extended coverage title insurance, and a report by a competent surveyor locating and
describing the property, showing all corners of the property properly and securely marked by
pins, and certifying as to encroachments. When, in the judgment of Buyer's attorneys, it anpears from conditions on the ground, or from information contained in the preliminary title
report or binder or other data submitted to such attorneys, that any corner or boundary line
of the property is not definitely located on the ground, or that there may be a conflict with
adjoining tracts, or that changes in the location of corners or lines have resulted from the
widening of any streets or roads, or that other conditions of uncertainty exist as to the size, location, or boundaries of the property, or that additional information is required to obtain a lot split,
Seller shall cause to be done at Seller's expense such additional survey work as may be necessary
to meet such objections, and shall furnish Buyer reports by the surveyor of such additional work.
8. 1USK OF LOSS. The risk of condemnation and the risk of loss, damage, or destruction
of the property or the improvements thereon by fire or otherwise shall be on Seller until the
closing. Buyer shall have the option to terminate this contract upon the destruction of, or
material change in the property, or improvements thereon, by any cause whatsoever.
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9. CONDITION OF PREMISES. Possession of the property in the same condition and state
of repair as on the date of execution hereof, subject only to normal wear, tear, and use since
said date, shall be delivered to Buyer at the closing, free of all leases, tenancies, and occupancies.
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10. TAXES AM) ASSESSMENTS. All real estate taxes pertaining to the property shall be
prorated between Buyer and Seller as of the closing. If at the closing Seller has paid the then
current year's taxes, copies of the receipt(s) shall be furnished to Buyer and said receipt(s) shall
be the basis for proration. If Seller has received but has not paid statement(s) for the then current
year's taxes, then said statement(s) shall be basis for proration. If at the closing the taxes for the
current year have not been paid and no statement(s) has (have) been received by Seller but
notice* s) of valuation has (have) been received by Seller, then said notice(s) of valuation times
the previous year's lax rate shall be the basis for proration, and it shall be the obligation of Buyer
to make payment of said current year's taxes. If none of these situations exht at the time of closing, the basis for proration shall be 110% of the previous year's taxes, and Seller agrees to furnish
Buyer copies of the receipt(s) for said previous year's taxes and to pay the then current year's
taxes.
All rents attributable to the property shall also be prorated.
If at the closing, the property or any part thereof shall be or shall have been affected by
an assessment or assessments which are or may become payable in annual installments, of
which the first installment is then a charge or lien on the property or has been paid, then for the
purposes of this contract all of the unpaid installments of any such assessment, including those
which are to become due and payable after the closing, shall be deemed to be due and payable
and to be liens upon the property and shall be paid and discharged by Seller.
11. CONDITIONS. Buyer shall not be required to accept title or pay for the property unless
the following conditions shall have been fulfilled (or waived by Buyer as provided herein) prior
to the closing:
(a) The property being so zoned as to permit the construction and operation of a convenience grocery and dairy products store, said zoning to be applied for and obtained by
and at the expense of Seller.
(b) Adequate public sewer, water, gas, and electricity lines being located on the property or in the street or alley immediately adjoining the property and being available for use
on the property at the expense of Seller and without additional cost to Buyer other than
normal connection charges.
(c) There being no covenant or restriction affecting the property or any restriction
under any State, County, City, or local laws, including ordinances, which would prohibit the
sale on the property of alcoholic beverages for consumption off the premises or of gasoline
or petroleum products.
<d) There being no easement or restriction on the property which would adversely
affee* the construction or operation thereon of a grocery store to be 'ocated as shown en
Exhibit "IV.
(e) A sign 'permit having been issued by the appropriate authorities for the installation
of building and polo signs of the type customarily installed by Buyer, said permit to be
applied !or and obtained'by and at the expense of Buyer.
(O The approval of the appropriate authorities of the location of the building, driveWAV, nnd curb, break . w -hown on Kxhibit- "TV, having been obtained, and n building permit
having been issued u.r the •on^trucUon of the improvements, said approval and permit to be
applied for and obtained ••>>• and at the expense of Buyer.
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(g) The survey reflecting conditions which will permit Buyer to construct the improvement? contemplated by Buyer in a manner and at a cost acceptable to Buyer.
(h) Test borings showing underground conditions satisfactory to Buyer being obtained
by and at the expense of Buyer.
In the event all of the above conditions have not been fulfilled as provided herein or waived
by Buyer within sixty (60; days from the date of this contract, this contract may be terminated
and cancelled at the option of Buyer by notice to LTIC and Seller, whereupon the earnest money
deposit shall be returned to Buyer.
12. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. If Buyer defaults in its obligations hereunder, the earnest
money deposit shall be retained by Seller as liquidated damages in lieu of any other remedy
available to Seller and Buyer shall be and is hereby released from all liability or obligation
hereunder.
13. BROKERAGE CHARGES. Seller agrees to pay all brokerage charges, if any, in connection with this transaction and to indemnify and save Buyer harmless against any and all claims
for such charges.
14. NOTICES. Any notice hereunder by either party to the other party shall be in writing
and shall be deemed to have been properly given when sent by United States Certified Mail,
Return Receipt Requested, postage fully prepaid, to the address of such other party as follows:
SELLER:
B1g Six Corporation
Archie 0. Coats, Vice President
3735 Wast 3500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
34120
BUYER:
The Southland Corporation
2828 Worth Haskell Avenue
Dallas, Texas
75204
15. IRREVOCABLE OFFER. In consideration of One ($1.00) Dollar in hand paid by Buyer
to Seller, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by Seller, Seller specifically agrees that this
oiler to sell is hereby made irrevocable for a period of 90 days from the date executed by Seller.
16. OTHER PROVISIONS. Seller agrees to execute a document in recordable form whicl
r e s t r i c t s i t s adjacent property as follows:
Seller agrees that no occupant of any building in the shopping center development at this location other than btjyer shall be allowed to sell packaged f l u i d
railk, packaged bread products, or delicatessen type food products for consul
tlon off the premises, except a grocery store occupyina a building containing
more than 10,000 square feet of floor space*

17. GENERAL. Time is of the essence to this contract, and this contract constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and may not be changed except by written agreement of the
parties.
Seller agrees to fully cooperate with Buyer in obtaining all necessary permits, lot splits,
zoning changes or other matters which are necessary to enable Buyer to use the property for the
purposes contemplated. This agreement by Seller shall survive the closing of this contract.
The provisions hereof shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto
and their respective heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns.
day of

Executed by Seller this

f\H-'/<~ L

19 7 ^ .

SELLER
(Seal)

Executed by Buyer this

^

day of \<r}<s-£s

/

, 19 7 5 ^

BUYER
ATTES^

/

"/

~<—-y T"^—^

By

u

' '
Vice President

Assistant Secretary
ATTACHMENTS:
£

E X H I B I T "A"

2

EXHIBIT " B "

•

EXHIBIT "C"

3
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AMENDMENT NO. 1
STORE NO. 2352-18345

On the 3rd day of July, 1975, Big Six Corporation as SELLER,
and The Southland Corporation as BUYER, entered into a purchase
agreement covering the premises commonly known as 3600 West and
/6200 South, Big Six Corporation Property and more f u l l y described
/ /

Exhibit

Exhibit

_ / ^ in -Schedule A, which Schedule is attached hereto and made a part
\j

hereof.
SELLER and BUYER presently desire to amend said purchase
agreement.
Now therefore, in consideration of the premises and $10 in hand
paid each to the other, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, said
purchase agreement shall be and is hereby amended as follows:
/*•)

1.

Legal Description is amended and attached hereto as
CTtntfvJU I Q* H .

Exhibit

2.

Lot size is amended to ]j5£ X 102 feet. Amended plot
plan is attached hereto as Schedule B. /
Exhibit

^i^---'

In a l l other respects said purchase agreement is hereby r a t i f i e d
and reaffirmed.
ATTEST:

y

Executed this
/ /

£/7^-~ day of

/ftuc/^

1 9 ^

BUYER
THE SOUJ
Byx
Vice President

Assistant Secretary
SELLER

BIG S I X CORPORATION

By.

**Mcv

r^
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EXHIBIT "A"
LEGAL DESCRIPTION

• ^ ^

/ ^

Beginning at a p o i n t which i s S°00'55" East 33 feet frcm the
North Quarter Corner of Section 20, Township 2 South Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and running thence South 0°00'55"
East 150 f e e t ; thence North 39°56'56" West 110 f e e t ; thence North
0°00'55" West.150 f e e t ; thence South 39°56'56 M East 110 feet
to the point of beginning.
Actual legal to be determined at time o f survey.
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SURVEYORS CifRTiriCATE:

I, Paul H. G i n i , do hereby certify that ! a m a Registered Land S u r v e y o r and that 1 h o l d certificate
No. 3149, as prescribed under the Laws of tha State of U t a h . I f u r t h e r certify t h a t by tno a u t h o r i t y of
ihe o w n e r .
j h a v e m a d e u survey a n d plot p l a n r?f the p r o p e r t y described h e r e o n .
i tvrthzr certify t h a t this p l a t correctly shows the true dimensions of the property
surveyed a n d of
the i m p r o v e m e n t s located thereon a n d that there are no encroachments or v i o i a t i o n s or the z o n i n g
ordinances except as s h o w n .
^
<•&'Ji"^
Aj J f*
DESCRIPTION:
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SURVEYORS CERTIFICATE:
I, Paul H. Gini, do hereby certify that I a m a Registered l a n d Surveyor a n d that I hold certificate
No. 2 1 4 9 , as prescribed under the Laws of the Stale of Utoh. 1 further certify that by the authority of
the owner,
I have m a d e a survey a n d plot plan of the property described hereon.
1 further certify that this plat correctly shows the true dimensions of the property surveyed and of
rht. u . ' r r 2 v e m e n u located thereon a n d that there are no encroachment* or violations of the zoning
0f£«r..3fices except Q$ shown.
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CITY OF WEST JORDAN
1850 WEST 7800 SOUTH
Phone 561-1464

WEST JORDAN, UTAH
84034

April 11, 1976

7-11 Stores
427 Lawndale Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
RE-:.

7-11 on, 6200 South and Dixie Drive

Gentlemen:
If the 7-11 store is faced West, we will allow
an access right-of-way in from 6200 South. We will
also want two right-of-ways in from Dixie Drive.
- ,. All property in front of the 7-11 store must be
black topped. All property must be landscaped.
The right-of-way on 6200 South will remain there
until the West Valley Expressway is completed past
the store. If the traffic is too heavy, the city
will request the access on 6200 South be closed and
the curb and gutter replaced or put in by 7-11 at
their expense.

Representative of 7-11

.SWW AND SUBSCRIBED REEQRE ME ON THIS DAT

<L±*

My commission expires^

)/y :c;.T.;n?uon c=?>f Dec. 13,

iili
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Robert Felton, 1056
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phone: (801) 359-9216
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

SOUTHLAND CORPORATON, a Texas
corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. C86-0195
Judge James S. Sawaya

GAIL C. POTTER, et al.
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * *

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, Judge of this Court, on April 11, 1986.

The Plaintiff

was represented by B.L. Dart and Ralph Jerman and the Defendant
was present with his counsel, Robert Felton.
The Court, having reviewed testimony at trial, the exhibits
admitted, and having heard the statements of counsel and for good
cause now enters its Findings of Fact as Follows:
1.

On or about June 4, 1984, Defendants, Gail Potter and

Lori Potter, bought the property described herein from Big Six
Corporation.

The property purchased by the Defendants is located

in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and more particularly
described as:
"Beginning at a point which is South 00° 00'
55" East 33.0 feet from the North quarter
corner of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 00° 00f 50" East 839.89
feet; thence South 89° 59' 05" West 331.10
feet; thence North 00° 01f 50" West 840.28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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feet, to the South line of 6200 South Street,
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 87.31 feet;
thence South 0° 01 f 30" East 129.0 feet;
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 160.0 feet,
thence North 0° 01 f 30" West 129.0 feet,
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 84.0 feet to the
point of beginning".
2.

In or about April, 1975, Plaintiff, Southland

Corporation, entered into an agreement
7-Eleven store.

to purchase a site for a

The property lies contiguous to that

purchased

by the Defendants in 1984.
3.

On or about March 9, 1976, the agreement

between

Southland Corporation and Big Six Corporation to purchase the
site for their store was amended to reduce the lot size to 160
102 feet.
4.

Plaintiff's claim of an easement

purchased by the Defendant

is without

across property

basis in that the Plaintl

acquired no property rights to cross this property, there is no
recorded document

conveying any easement

or property rights to

the Plaintiff to use or cross the Defendants 1

property and the

parties have admitted

that there was no written conveyance or

recordable instrument

conveying any property right to the

contiguous property purchased by the Defendants.

Further, no

consideration was exchanged for any property interest

in the

property owned by the Defendants.
5.

Defendants' claim for damages for trespass is not

supported by the evidence.

The Counterclaim

for damages should

be dismissed.
NOW WHEREFORE, the Court having heretofore entered

its

Findings of Fact enters these conclusions of law as follows:
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1.

On or about June 4, 1984, Defendants Gail Potter and

Lori Potter obtained title to the following

real property in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, by Warranty Deed from the predecessor
in interest, Big Six Corporation.

The property is described as:

"Beginning at a point which is South 00° 00 f
55" East 33.0 feet from the North quarter
corner of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 00° 00 f 50" East 839.89
feet, thence South 89° 59' 05" West 331.10
feet, thence North 00° 01 f 50" West 840.28
feet, to the South line of 6200 South Street;
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 87.31 feet,
thence South 0° 01' 30" East 129.0 feet;
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 160.0 feet,
thence North 0° 01 f 30" West 129.0 feet;
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 84.0 feet to the
point of beginning".
2.

Defendants are the owners of the real property

described

herein free and clear from any property interest on behalf of the
Plaintiff and title to the property should be quieted to the
Defendants free and clear of any right or interest of the
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff maintains no easement or other property

right adverse to the Defendants in the foregoing
3.

property.

Plaintiff's claim of an easement across the property

owned by the Defendants is without

basis in that the Plaintiff

acquired no property rights to cross this property; there is no
recorded document conveying an easement

or property rights to the

Plaintiff to use or cross this realty; the parties have admitted
there was no written conveyance or recordable instrument
conveying any property right in the foregoing realty, there was
no consideration or other enforceable right created and
Defendants 1

rights in the property are superior to those of the

Plaintiff.
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4.

Defendants' Counterclaim for damages for trespass are

not supported by the evidence and should be dismissed no cause of
. ,-;..

act ion.
5.

..-*-•••

Defendants are entitled to their costs.

DATED this

^L^

day of June, 1986.
By the Court

ZV—
James S. Sawaya, Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by United
States first-class mail, postage prepaid, to B.L. Dart and Ralph
L. Jerman, 1407 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 on
the

day of June, 1986.
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Robert Felton, 1056
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phone; (801) 359-9216
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *
SOUTHLAND CORPORATON, a Texas
corporat ion,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT
vs
Civil No. C86-0195
Judge James S* Sawaya

GAIL C. POTTER, et al.
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * *

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, Judge of this Court, on April 11, 1986.

Plaintiff,

Southland corporation, was represented by B.L. Dart and Ralph L.
Jerman.

Defendants were represented by their counsel, Robert

Felton.

This mater was tried ad argued befoe the Court and

thereafter taken under advisement.
The Court now being fully informed in the premises and
heretofore reveiwed the pleadings and evidence submitted at trial
having heard the arguments of counsel and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters
its judgments as follows:
1.

Title to the following property located in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, is hereby quieted in the Defendantsf, Gail
C. Potter and Lori S. Potter, free and clear of any claims,
property rights or easements on behalf of the Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed no caus« of action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The real property which is quieted to the Defendants is
located in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and more
particularly described as;
"Beginning at a point which is South 00° 00'
55" East 33.0 feet from the North quarter
corner of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 00° 00 f 50" East 839.89
feet; thence South 89° 59 1 05" West 331.10
feet, thence North 00° 01 1 50" West 840.28
feet, to the South line of 6200 South Street;
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 87.31 feet;
thence South 0° 01 f 30" East 129.0 feet;
thence South 89° 56 f 56" East 160.0 feet,
thence North 0° 01 f 30" West 129.0 feet;
thence South 89° 56' 56" East 84.0 feet to the
point of beginning".
2.

Defendants 1 Counterclaim for damages is hereby

dismissed, no cause of action.
3.

Costs are awarded to Defendants.

DATED this

^ \

day of June, 1986.

By the Court:

James S. Sawaya, Judge
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